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ESTABLISHING A MORE EFFECTIVE SAFMR SYSTEM:
THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF HUD’S 2016 SMALL AREA
FAIR MARKET RENT RULE
John Treat*

ABSTRACT
This Note analyzes the new HUD rule finalized in November 2016, which dramatically changed the structure of the Housing Choice Voucher program in select
metropolitan areas. In August 2017, HUD suspended automatic implementation
of the rule until 2020 for twenty-three of the twenty-four selected metropolitan areas,
but in December 2017, a preliminary injunction was granted requiring HUD to
implement the rule as of January 1, 2018. The rule as written changes the method
for calculating the vouchers from using a metropolitan area-wide average to calculating a separate level for each zip code. Such a change could greatly deconcentrate
poverty and reduce economic and racial segregation; a result that the current status
quo has failed to accomplish. The new rule, however, is not without its flaws. This
Note offers a number of recommendations for changing the rule to address these
flaws: (1) tweaking metro area selection criteria to include large, highly-segregated
areas; (2) granting public housing agencies flexibility in implementing the rule; (3)
including new protections for gentrifying neighborhoods and additional funding
for landlord outreach and mobility counseling; and (4) revising methodology to
increase accuracy. Despite the problems with the new rule, as long as HUD is truly
committed to implementing it, its benefits are likley to outweigh its flaws.

I. THE HCV PROGRAM

AND THE

NEW SAFMR RULE

A. Introduction
In June 2016, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) announced a significant change to its Housing
Choice Voucher (HCV) program,1 which it finalized on November
16, 2016.2 The final rule will change HUD’s existing fair market
*
J.D. Candidate, University of Michigan Law School, May 2018.
1.
Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System; Using Small Area Fair Market
Rents in Housing Choice Voucher Program Instead of the Current 50th Percentile FMRs, 81
Fed. Reg. 39,218 (proposed June 16, 2016) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 888, 982, 983 &
985).
2.
Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System; Using Small Area Fair Market
Rents in Housing Choice Voucher Program Instead of the Current 50th Percentile FMRs, 81
Fed. Reg. 80,567 (Nov. 16, 2016) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 888, 982, 983, 985) [hereinafter Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System].
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rent (FMR) calculation in certain metropolitan areas from the fiftieth percentile rent for the entire area to small area fair market
rents (SAFMRs).3 In these metro areas, FMRs, which are the
voucher amounts given to program participants, will instead be calculated at the zip code level.4 HUD believes that the rule will
deconcentrate poverty by helping voucher holders move to higheropportunity, lower-cost neighborhoods.5
In August 2017, HUD announced that it was suspending the
mandatory implementation of SAFMRs until 2020 in twenty-three
of the twenty-four metro areas which had been set to implement
SAFMRs in October 2017. HUD stated three reasons for suspending
the rule: (1) review of the interim findings of the SAFMR demonstrations received in April 2017; (2 )review of forthcoming public
comments in response to an invitation to find regulations that are
outdated, ineffective, and excessively burdensome; and (3) the necessity of completing guidance and technical assistance for
impacted public housing agencies (PHAs).6 In the suspension notice, HUD recognized that some PHAs may still voluntarily
implement SAFMRs, and it promised to expedite the approval process for PHAs in the twenty-three impacted metro areas.
However, in December 2017, the District Court for the District of
Columbia issued a preliminary injunction requiring HUD to implement the rule on its effective date of January 1, 2018, finding that
HUD’s suspension of the rule without allowing for notice and comment was unlawful, and that suspension was arbitrary and
capricious.7 The court found that because HUD failed to identify
adverse rental housing market conditions local to the twenty-three
impacted metro areas, HUD did not meet the requirements of 24
C.F.R. § 888.113(c)(4), and thus lacked authority to suspend the
rule as it did.8
This Note analyzes the final rule as written, focusing especially on
the changes HUD made in response to concerns that were brought
3.
24 C.F.R. § 888.113(i)(1)(i)(2017).
4.
24 C.F.R. § 888.113(d)(2).
5.
81 Fed. Reg. at 80,567.
6.
As a note, reasons two and three appear to be merely justifications for suspending
the rule as part of the Trump administration’s larger policy of slimming the Federal Register.
See, e.g., Eric Lipton & Danielle Ivory, Trump Says His Regulatory Rollback Already Is the
‘Most Far-Reaching’, The New York Times (December 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/12/14/us/politics/trump-federal-regulations.html1. I anticipate that the comments
solicited in reason two will not find this rule to be outdated, ineffective, or burdensome, and
while HUD should provide PHAs with additional guidance and technical assistance, it could
do so while allowing implementation of the rule.
7.
Open Communities Alliance v. Carson, No. 17-2192, at 17 (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 2017).
8.
Id. at 17-18.
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up during the notice and comment period. These changes include
additional protections for existing voucher holders, adding additional criteria for a metro area to switch to SAFMRs, and addressing
administrative burdens. Uncertainty exists resulting from HUD’s
suspension of the rule and its subsequent re-implementation as a
result of the preliminary injunction, as well as the possibility of an
appeal. Despite flaws in the final rule which could prevent SAFMRs
from having their desired impact, the rule should be implemented,
as it offers a real chance to bring about the results HUD anticipates.
Part I of this Note discusses the history and structure of the HCV
program and lays out the provisions of the final rule as written. Part
II analyzes the rule and its potential impacts, focusing on six key
issues raised by the comments to the proposed rule. Part III offers
recommendations for tweaking the rule and argues that the rule
should be implemented, since it has the potential to benefit HCV
voucher holders.

B. History and Structure of the HCV Program
Before Congress created the HCV program in 1974, the government housed low-income families in traditional public housing.
Public housing, however, had the effect of destroying nearby property values, and was often associated with segregation, social stigma,
and the “misery and hopelessness of poverty.”9 The HCV program
was designed to break this cycle—and effectively attack concentrated poverty and housing segregation—by enabling voucher
holders to move where they please.10 Since the mid-1980s, nearly
every new federal dollar for low-income housing has gone to HCVs,
rather than public housing.11
The HCV program serves 2.2 million families, which constitutes
only around a quarter of qualified people.12 To qualify, a household
must earn less than fifty percent of the metro area median income.13 Given the number of low-income people, there is often a
9.
J. Peter Byrne & Michael Diamond, Affordable Housing, Land Tenure, and Urban Policy:
The Matrix Revealed, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527, 528 (2007).
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2012).
11. See Kristine L. Zeabart, Note, Requiring a True Choice in Housing Choice Voucher Programs, 79 IND. L.J. 767, 768 (2004).
12. See Alana Semuels, How Housing Policy Is Failing America’s Poor, ATLANTIC (June 24,
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/06/section-8-is-failing/396650/.
13. Housing Choice Vouchers Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING AND URB. DEV., [https://
web.archive.org/web/20180113214153/https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/public_indi
an_housing/programs/hcv/about/fact_sheet] (last visited Jan. 13, 2017). In addition, at
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lengthy waiting list to receive a voucher.14 Once a family receives a
voucher, it searches on the private market for a unit, for which it
pays thirty percent of its income in rent, with the voucher covering
the rest.15 Voucher holders have only a limited time to find an
apartment; if they do not, they lose their voucher.16 There are a
number of reasons why a voucher holder might fail to find a unit:
lack of affordable and available housing stock,17 too few participating landlords, inability to understand the program, and
discrimination against voucher holders, among others.18 Landlord
cooperation is voluntary,19 but if landlords choose to take an HCV
tenant, they must follow HUD regulations, including passing annual inspections.20
HUD funds the HCV program through grants to local PHAs.21
HUD sets voucher amounts according to FMR levels, which it defines as “housing market-wide estimates of rents” that allow voucher
holders “to rent standard quality housing throughout the geographic area. . . .”22 HUD uses a variety of data sources to calculate
FMRs: the Census, American Community Survey (ACS) data calculated every four years, random telephone dialing, and any
statistically valid data it receives.23 The FMRs are adjusted from yearto-year using national Consumer Price Index data. HUD uses its
two-bedroom estimates as the basis for other unit sizes, rather than
calculating an estimate for each unit size independently.24 Prior to
least seventy-five percent of families in the program in any given area must be given to “applicants whose incomes do not exceed 30 percent of the area median income.” Id.
14. See Byrne & Diamond, supra note 9, at 605. For example, the New York City Housing
Authority has not accepted new applications since 2007, and 147,033 families currently sit on
the waiting list. See Community Service Society et al., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule
Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System 2 (Aug. 15, 2016), http://www.regulations.gov/document?D=HUD-2016-0063-0044.
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(2)(A); see also Byrne & Diamond, supra note 9, at 605. While
a family can choose to pay more than thirty percent of their income, they cannot pay more
than forty percent. See 42 U.S.C § 1437f(o)(3).
16. Byrne & Diamond, supra note 9, at 605. This is not a rare occurrence: the national
success rate for leasing a unit is sixty-nine percent, over half of voucher holders take longer
than six months to find an apartment, and a quarter lose their vouchers altogether. See Community Service Society et al., supra note 14, at 4.
17. See David A. Vandenbroucke, Is There Enough Housing to Go Around?, 9 CITYSCAPE: J.
POL’Y DEV. & RES. 175, 176 (2007) (analyzing whether there is enough affordable, available,
and adequate housing for low-income people).
18. Byrne & Diamond, supra note 9, at 605–06.
19. See, e.g., Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments, 136 F.3d 293, 300 (2d Cir.
1998).
20. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.401–06 (2017).
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(1)(A) (2012).
22. 24 C.F.R. § 888.113(a).
23. 24 C.F.R. § 888.113(e)(1).
24. 24 C.F.R. § 888.113(f)(1).
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the SAFMR rule, HUD set FMRs at the fortieth or fiftieth percentile
rent (depending on the geographic area), which is “the dollar
amount below which the rent for [forty] or [fifty] percent of standard quality rental housing units falls.”25

C. The Final SAFMR Rule as Written
Unfortunately, the HCV program has not had its intended effect
of deconcentrating poverty and establishing racial desegregation;26
despite a voucher holder’s ability to use his voucher anywhere, the
national majority still live in low-rent, high-poverty neighborhoods.27 In response, HUD promulgated the SAFMR rule, switching
from metro area-wide FMRs to SAFMRs. The rule’s purpose is to
“[establish] a more effective means for HCV tenants to move into
areas of higher opportunity and lower poverty,”28 which HUD
hopes will “help reduce the number of voucher families that reside
in areas of high poverty concentration.”29 A 2016 study found that
moving to lower-poverty areas as a young child has significant longterm effects in terms of college attendance rates and adult earnings.30 These gains increase the younger the child is at the age of
the move.31
HUD explains that switching to a smaller geographic area for calculating FMRs will accomplish these goals because SAFMRs reflect
neighborhood differences, instead of a single standard that may be
too high or too low for the resident’s neighborhood.32 To account
for these intraregional rent variations, HUD chose to use zip codes
as proxies for neighborhoods.33 HUD’s belief that a smaller geographic area will lead to more mobility is backed by promising early
returns from the few PHAs that have implemented SAFMRs on a
25. Id.
26. In Open Communities Alliance, HUD conceded as much. See Open Communities Alliance, supra note 7, at 46. See also, e.g., Stacy Seicshnaydre, Missed Opportunity: Furthering Fair
Housing in the Housing Choice Voucher Program, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 188–94 (2016)
(finding minimal voucher household access to low-poverty neighborhoods in New Orleans).
27. Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System, 81 Fed. Reg. 80,567,
80,567–68 (Nov. 16, 2016) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 888, 982, 983, 985).
28. Id. at 80,567. See generally Kirk McClure, The Prospects for Guiding Housing Choice
Voucher Households to High-Opportunity Neighborhoods, 12 CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. & RES. 101,
118 (2010) (identifying the characteristics that make a high-opportunity neighborhood).
29. 81 Fed. Reg. at 80,567.
30. Raj Chetty et al., The Effects of Exposure to Better Neighborhoods on Children: New Evidence
from the Moving to Opportunity Experiment, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 855 (2016).
31. Id.
32. 81 Fed. Reg. at 80,567.
33. Id. at 80,568.
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trial basis.34 HUD cites the results from these PHAs as evidence that
the program will have the desired effect nationally.35 The trial programs were first announced in 2010, and HUD began using
SAFMRs in five PHAs as a demonstration in 2012.36 However,
SAFMRs were first implemented in practice in 2011 not as part of
these demonstrations, but separately in Dallas as part of a settlement to a lawsuit.37 A 2016 study of the results of the Dallas
program, upon which HUD relied heavily in adopting this rule,
found that the switch to SAFMRs led to a rise in neighborhood
quality for voucher holders while being cost-neutral for the PHA.38
HUD projects that the main benefit of the program will be to
assist households in affording units in high-opportunity areas with
better schools and less poverty, with ancillary benefits being shortterm per-voucher cost decreases for PHAs and reducing overpayment of rent where neighborhood rent is lower than the metro
average used for FMRs.39 HUD also identified three main concerns
associated with the switch to SAFMRs. First, it anticipates administrative costs for PHAs to implement the new standards.40 Second, it
projects that households that cannot or choose not to move to a
higher-opportunity area will be worse off as their voucher amount
will decrease.41 Third, it concludes that the switch will lead to longterm raises in per-voucher costs as families move to higher cost areas, which ultimately would cause fewer households to get
assistance without a commensurate increase in total HCV funding.42

34. See id.
35. See id.
36. The PHAs are Cook County (Ill.), Long Beach (Calif.), Chattanooga (Tenn.),
Mamaroneck (N.Y.), and Laredo (Tex.). See id. at 80,570.
37. See id. HUD’s August 2017 announcement delaying implementation of SAFMRs exempted Dallas, ensuring that SAFMRs would continue to be in place there despite the legal
proceedings. See Semuels, supra note 12.
38. Robert Collinson & Peter Ganong, The Incidence of Housing Voucher Generosity 4
(July 1, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2255799. The factors that the authors used to measure neighborhood quality are: (1)
poverty rate; (2) fourth grade test scores at the local school; (3) unemployment rate; (4)
share of children in families with single mothers; and (5) violent crime rate. Id. at 15. They
found that the neighborhoods where voucher holders moved had large improvements in
violent crime rate, moderate improvements in poverty and unemployment rates, and no statistically significant improvement in test scores and share of families with single mothers. Id.
at 16.
39. See 81 Fed. Reg. at 80,569.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
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As discussed above, the rule mandates a switch from fiftieth percentile FMRs to SAFMRs in certain metro areas.43 HUD adopted
five criteria to determine which metro areas will switch to SAFMRs:
(1) the number of vouchers under lease in the metro FMR area; (2)
the percentage of the standard quality rental stock lying in zip
codes where the SAFMRs are over 110% of the metro area FMRs;
(3) the percentage of voucher families living in concentrated lowincome areas (CLIAs); (4) the percentage of voucher families living
in CLIAs out of the percentage of all renters in CLIAs across the
metro area; and (5) the metro area’s vacancy rate.44 The proposed
rule did not include the last two factors, which HUD added into the
final rule after receiving public comments.45 In the final rule, HUD
did not change its methodology to calculate FMRs, its adjustment
process from year-to-year, or its adjustments for bedroom sizes.

II. ANALYSIS

OF THE

FINAL RULE

AS

WRITTEN

In the final rule, HUD responded to many of the issues raised
during the notice and comment period, either making changes to
the proposed rule or explaining why it did not do so.46 It did not
change its methodology to calculate FMRs, its year-to-year adjustment process, or its adjustments for bedroom sizes. It did, however,
make a number of changes reflecting the comments received,
which can be grouped into a few broad categories: (1) burdens for
PHAs and landlords; (2) protections for current voucher holders;
(3) methodology problems; (4) concerns about desegregation impacts; (5) need for greater flexibility for PHAs; and (6)
promulgation before the SAFMR demonstrations are finished. This
Note addresses each of these categories in turn, identifying how the
final rule handles each issue and analyzing the effects that may occur as a result of implementing the final rule.
43. 24 C.F.R. § 888.113(i) (2017). The rule eliminates the fiftieth percentile FMR designation completely, and all metropolitan areas that do not switch to SAFMRs will use fortieth
percentile FMRs. Id.
44. 24 C.F.R § 888.113(c)(i)–(v) (2017). HUD explains that it codified the selection
criteria in the regulatory text, but not the selection values, which it will make available for
public comment in notices published in the Federal Register. Establishing a More Effective
Fair Market Rent System, 81 Fed. Reg. 80,567, 80,569 (Nov. 16, 2016) (to be codified at 24
C.F.R. pts. 888, 982, 983, 985). It set these values at: (1) at least 2,500 vouchers; (2) at least
20% of standard quality rental stock in zip codes where SAFMRs are over 110% of metropolitan area FMRs; (3) the ratio of voucher holders living in CLIA to all renters is over 1.55; (4)
the proportion must be over 25%; and (5) a vacancy rate over 4%. See id. at 80,568–69.
45. See id. at 80,568-69.
46. See id. at 80,568, 80,571–79.
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A. Burdens for PHAs and Landlords
Commenters, especially PHAs, worried that switching to SAFMRs
will add administrative burdens for PHAs. Most obviously, the rule
increases the number of payment standards that PHAs must navigate, especially for those with large jurisdictions.47 This increase is
the point of the rule, but implementing more standards will require
new software systems, landlord outreach and training programs,48
as well as possibly causing conflicts with other voucher programs.49
Commenters also found problematic the notion that SAFMRs, if
they work as designed, will decrease the number of families that
PHAs can serve. Simply put, if large numbers of low-income
voucher holders move to higher-cost areas, the amount HUD must
pay per voucher will increase, and without additional funding,
PHAs will have to reduce the number of vouchers they issue.50
In the proposed rule, HUD solicited comments as to whether it
should raise its standard for rent reasonableness redeterminations
from five to ten percent to minimize administrative burdens on
PHAs.51 Rent reasonableness is a requirement that a PHA not approve a lease until it determines that the rent offered is reasonable,
and PHAs must redetermine the reasonable rent for all units where
FMRs decline by a certain percentage from the previous year.52
Most commenters argued that HUD should raise the trigger percentage because five percent is low enough to trip the requirement
when HUD alters the methodology or data sources for SAFMRs.53
47. See, e.g., Area Housing Authority of the County of Ventura, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System 1 (Aug. 15, 2016), https://
www.regulations.gov/document?D=HUD-2016-0063-0103 (noting that the authority’s jurisdiction includes forty zip codes).
48. California Association of Housing Authorities, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule to
Use Small Area Fair Market Rents for the Housing Choice Voucher Program 3 (Aug. 11,
2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=HUD-2016-0063-0025.
49. See California Housing Partnership, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Establishing
a More Effective Fair Market Rent System 3 (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=HUD-2016-0063-0054. The rule limits the use of SAFMRs to the HCV program,
which will force PHAs to use SAFMRs for HCVs, but metropolitan area FMRs for other
voucher programs. Id.; see 81 Fed. Reg. at 80,575.
50. See Prairie State Legal Services., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Establishing a
More Effective Fair Market Rent System 3 (Aug. 11, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=HUD-2016-0063-0028. Commenters argued that the cost neutrality of the
SAFMR program in Dallas will not be extrapolated nationally. See, e.g., Community Service
Society et al., supra note 14, at 5–6.
51. Id. at 85,074.
52. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.507 (2017).
53. See e.g., Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP), Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System 5 (Aug. 15, 2016), https://
www.regulations.gov/document?D=HUD-2016-0063-0092. But see National Association of
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Commenters also anticipated that switching to SAFMRs will cause
many landlords to leave the program. Since the HCV program gives
voucher holders money to find housing in the private market, landlord participation is essential to the program’s success. For
landlords that own property in multiple zip codes, HUD adds a series of differing payment standards to an already burdensome
process of renting to an HCV tenant, which will force landlords to
rent nearby units at different prices.54 Commenters also worried
that landlords will leave if payment standards decrease (which they
will in many areas),55 because decreased payment standards will not
lead to anticipated decreases in rent.56 In Alameda County (Calif.),
where FMRs have not kept up with rent increases, the program lost
910 landlords over the previous five years and 687 over the last
two.57 Looking forward, the Tacoma (Wash.) Housing Agency surveyed local landlords about SAFMRs and found that many would
leave the program.58
HUD in the final rule did not address many of these concerns. It
acknowledged that PHAs could be burdened, but did not attempt
to alleviate the burden, instead merely listing it as one of the rule’s
potential costs.59 Similarly, it did not make any changes to prevent
landlords from leaving the program, and the results of the final
rule in terms of landlord participation remain to be seen. It did,
Home Builders, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System 7 (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=HUD-20160063-0048 (arguing that HUD should leave the requirement at five percent but allow PHAs
to opt out of SAFMRs).
54. See California Association of Housing Authorities, supra note 48, at 3; Rent Stabilization Association of NYC, Inc., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Establishing a More
Effective Fair Market Rent System 2 (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?
D=HUD-2016-0063-0017.
55. See, e.g., Oakland Housing Authority, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System 3 (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.regulations.
gov/document?D=HUD-2016-0063-0036 (noting that the hypothetical 2015 SAFMRs would
have decreased payment standards by over five percent in all but one zip code in Oakland).
56. See New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development
(NYCHPD) & New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA), Comment Letter on Proposed
Rule Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System 4 (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.
regulations.gov/document?D=HUD-2016-0063-0078.
57. Housing Authority of the County of Alameda, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule
Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System 2 (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=HUD-2016-0063-0061.
58. Tacoma Housing Authority, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Establishing a More
Effective Fair Market Rent System 3 (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=HUD-2016-0063-0114.
59. Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System, Establishing a More Effective
Fair Market Rent System, 81 Fed. Reg. 80,567, 80,570 (Nov. 16, 2016) (to be codified at 24
C.F.R. pts. 888, 982, 983, 985).
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however, adopt the commenters’ consensus suggestion for rent reasonableness. The final rule incorporated this suggestion for all FMR
and SAFMR areas, as well as including a limit on the annual decrease of FMRs, including SAFMRs.60 HUD explained that this limit
is for protecting tenants, but will also alleviate PHA burden where
SAFMRs are well below metro area FMRs.61
In the August 2017 notice delaying implementation of SAFMRs,
HUD identified these administrative concerns as a reason for the
delay. Specifically, it stated that it has been developing guidance
and technical assistance to aid PHAs in implementing the rule, but
that these services have not yet been provided to PHAs due to a
review of various regulations and policies, concerns about implementing the SAFMR rule in concert with regulatory burden
reduction and reform, and the necessity of incorporating the data
from the April 2017 interim report into these services.

B. Protections for Current Voucher Holders
HUD claims that SAFMRs will increase tenant choice.62 Commenters, however, feared that this choice will not be a decision
regarding which high-opportunity neighborhood to move to, but
one regarding whether to pay more out of pocket to stay in the
person’s current unit or face eviction. The payment standards for
the vast majority of voucher holders in SAFMR areas will decrease
with a switch to SAFMRs.63 This is not surprising given the distribution of voucher holders in low-income neighborhoods; in fact, it is
an essential feature of SAFMRs’ push-pull approach. The pull is
higher standards for high-rent areas to incentivize voucher holders
to move there, while the push is lower payment standards in lowrent areas to incentivize them to move away from there.64 This approach assumes that voucher holders will be able to find housing in
high-income neighborhoods. Several commenters questioned this
60. Id. at 80,575.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 80,571.
63. Approximately seventy-eight percent of current voucher holders (435,000 families)
in metropolitan areas that would have switched to SAFMRs under the proposed rule would
have lower payment standards. The National Preservation Working Group, Comment Letter
on Proposed Rule Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System 4 (Aug. 15, 2016),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=HUD-2016-0063-0047. In all but two of the
SAFMR areas from the proposed rule, over half of voucher holders would have lower payment standards. Id.
64. See Community Service Society et al., supra note 14, at 3.
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assumption. These commenters cited a lack of available housing,65
no housing mobility counseling, high security deposits and moving
expenses, and racial and source of income discrimination as barriers to moving.66 The commenters also argued that many voucher
holders chose to live in low-income neighborhoods and should not
be forced to move. Reasons for doing so include family, friends,
church, medical care, other support networks, and proximity to employment and public transportation.67 Thus, some families may not
move to what HUD deems a “better” neighborhood even if given
the choice.68
If voucher holders living in low-rent neighborhoods are unwilling or unable to move to a high-rent neighborhood, they face a
potentially devastating choice if they cannot negotiate a lower rent:
pay more out of pocket to cover the difference between the rent
and their voucher or lose their housing.69 The commenters argued
that HUD should not implement a rule forcing low-income Americans to pay extra to keep their current housing,70 as these
differences may be substantial—for example, $564 on average for
hypothetical SAFMRs in Oakland.71 In New York City, the average
household income for voucher holders is only $15,803, making paying more out of pocket very burdensome.72 In 2013, when the PHA
administering the HCV program in New York City lost five percent
65. For example, in Westchester (N.Y.) County, the high-income town of Briarcliff
Manor has hypothetical SAFMRs that are $780 higher than the low-income city of Yonkers,
which should incentivize HCV tenants to move to Briarcliff Manor, but Yonkers has fifteen
times the number of available apartments. See Supportive Housing Network of New York,
Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System 2
(Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=HUD-2016-0063-0051.
66. See Homes and Community Renewal, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System 3 (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.regulations.
gov/document?D=HUD-2016-0063-0115; National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Establishing a More Effective Fair Market
Rent System 3–5 (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=HUD-20160063-0113; The Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Comment Letter on Proposed
Rule Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System 3 (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.
regulations.gov/document?D=HUD-2016-0063-0104.
67. See National Multifamily Housing Council, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System 3 (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.regulations.
gov/document?D=HUD-2016-0063-0080; The Preservation Working Group, supra note 63, at
4.
68. See The Preservation Working Group, supra note 63, at 4.
69. See Community Service Society et al., supra note 14, at 8.
70. See, e.g., Prairie State Legal Services, supra note 50, at 2.
71. California Housing Partnership, supra note 49, at 3.
72. Debi Rose, New York City Council, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Establishing
a More Effective Fair Market Rent System 2 (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=HUD-2016-0063-0082.
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of its budget, 4,583 families faced this move/pay choice, and eightythree percent chose to stay and pay more.73
Commenters worried that SAFMRs will have a particularly damaging effect in gentrifying neighborhoods. Gentrifying
neighborhoods are previously low-income neighborhoods that are
rapidly improving in quality and increasing in price—which will not
be reflected in HUD’s outdated ACS data.74 Low-income residents
will want to continue to live in desirable gentrifying neighborhoods
as income levels rise, amenities improve, and crime rates fall.75
However, they will not be able to do so, as payment standards are
likely to decrease with SAFMRs, forcing low-income renters into the
move/pay choice described above.76 Of course, SAFMRs will presumably catch up to rising rents in a few years, but it is likely that
the lag will force out current tenants in the meantime and make
them less likely to be able to move back once the units there are
taken.77
Based on these comments, HUD substantially changed the rule
to protect tenants from adverse effects. First, it incorporated a section of the Housing Opportunity Through Modernization Act of
2016, allowing PHAs to hold harmless those tenants who stay in
their units.78 Second, it limited the amount that FMRs can decrease
annually to ninety percent of the previous standard.79 Third, it gave
PHAs more flexibility to set payment standards between the existing
metro area FMRs and the new, lower SAFMRs, giving PHAs some
budgetary leeway but still ensuring that the reduction for tenants is
modest.80 Each of these provisions will protect voucher holders—
especially those in gentrifying neighborhoods—from immediate
application of dramatic payment standard reductions, giving them
73.
74.
75.
76.

NYCHPD & NYCHA, supra note 56, at 4.
See Community Service Society et al., supra note 14, at 6.
Id.
See MAXWELL AUSTENSEN ET AL., N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR., STATE OF NEW YORK CITY’S
HOUSING AND NEIGHBORHOODS IN 2015 6 (2016), http://furmancenter.org/files/sotc/NYUFurmanCenter_SOCin2015_9JUNE2016.pdf (classifying fifteen New York City
neighborhoods as gentrifying); Community Service Society et al., supra note 14, at 6 (citing
the Austensen report to assert that twelve of the fifteen gentrifying neighborhoods would see
lower payment standards).
77. See Council of Large Public Housing Authorities, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule
Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System 7 (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=HUD-2016-0063-0070.
78. Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System, 81 Fed. Reg. 80,567, 80,572
(Nov. 16, 2016) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 888, 982, 983, 985); see Enterprise Community Partners, Inc., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Establishing a More Effective Fair
Market Rent System 4 (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=HUD2016-0063-0081.
79. 81 Fed. Reg. at 80,572; see CBPP, supra note 53, at 4.
80. 81 Fed. Reg. at 80,572.
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time to adjust to the new program and find a unit in a higher-cost
neighborhood. However, it is likely that some voucher holders will
still face adverse consequences before any potential reductions because PHAs do not have to implement the hold harmless policies
and FMRs are already near the lower edge of the market in many
areas.81

C. Issues with HUD’s Methodology
Many of the commenters questioned both HUD’s methodology
for calculating the SAFMRs and the criteria used to determine
which metro areas must switch to SAFMRs. First and foremost,
many commenters argued that HUD uses outdated data that undervalues the true rent values in many markets.82 In the final rule,
HUD merely adopted the data sources currently used for FMRs,
which were already “a longstanding complaint. . . .”83 Particularly
problematic is the continued use of the ACS data calculated every
four years, causing the projected SAFMRs to be lower than actual
market rents in areas with increasing rental costs.84 Commenters
from across the country, from New York City,85 to Washington,
D.C.,86 to Oakland,87 offered data showing the gap between the proposed SAFMRs and their local conditions. Switching to SAFMRs will
only exacerbate this problem, as smaller areas are subject to faster
and greater change than entire metro areas.88
81. See, e.g., District of Columbia Housing Authority, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule
Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System 1 (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=HUD-2016-0063-0112 (noting that SAFMRs lag behind market rent
in two District of Columbia. zip codes by over $600).
82. See, e.g., Housing Partnership Network, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System 4 (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.regulations.
gov/document?D=HUD-2016-0063-0079.
83. Id.; see also Geoff Boeing & Paul Waddell, New Insights into Rental Housing Markets
Across the United States: Web Scraping and Analyzing Craigslist Rental Listings, 37 J. PLAN. EDUC. &
RES. 457, (2016) (finding that nationally, thirty-seven percent of listings are below the FMRs,
but in some areas, fewer than ten percent of the listings are below the FMRs).
84. See National Multifamily Housing Council, supra note 67, at 5.
85. See, e.g., Daniel Squadron & Brian Kavanagh, New York State Senate and Assembly,
Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System 3
(Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=HUD-2016-0063-0107 (noting a
$441 drop for vouchers on Manhattan’s increasingly costly Lower East Side).
86. See, e.g., District of Columbia Housing Authority, supra note 81, at 1 (noting that
sixty-five of D.C.’s sixty-nine zip codes would see a decrease from FMRs to SAFMRs).
87. See, e.g., Non-Profit Housing Association of Northern California, Comment Letter on
Proposed Rule Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System 1 (Aug. 11, 2016),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=HUD-2016-0063-0034.
88. See Tacoma Housing Authority, supra note 58, at 2.
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The commenters also pointed to other features carried over
from the FMR calculation that they alleged will lead to inaccurate
SAFMRs: using national rather than local inflation trend factors,
not basing SAFMRs on local survey data, and not using separate
calculations for each unit size. Using national inflation trends ensures that SAFMRs will not keep pace with rents where rent
increases faster than the national average.89 For example, in Oakland, the fastest growing rental market in the country,90 recent
FMRs have been around the same or even declined.91 In 2013 and
2015, PHAs and interested nonprofits in the Bay Area paid for
rental surveys that convinced HUD to raise FMRs there by sixteen
and thirty-four percent, respectively.92 But commenters argued that
these groups should not have to pay for costly surveys to get accurate SAFMRs.93 To fix these issues, commenters suggested that
HUD should use and carry forward local rent survey data where
available,94 and should use the percentage change in metro areawide rents that HUD publishes quarterly as a more accurate local
inflation factor.95 Lastly, they contended that HUD should calculate
SAFMRs for all unit sizes to avoid “apples-to-oranges comparisons”
between different unit sizes.96
Second, many commenters questioned the criteria HUD uses to
determine which metro areas must switch to SAFMRs. The Center
on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) argued that HUD should
use absolute measures of voucher-holder concentration, rather
than relative concentration, because using relative concentration
excludes metro areas where high percentages of all renters are concentrated in low-income areas.97 CBPP also argued that the
requirement that twenty percent of rental stock is located in highSAFMR zip codes should instead be fifteen percent, which would
89. See Preservation of Affordable Housing, Inc., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule
Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System 2 (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=HUD-2016-0063-0041.
90. See Housing Authority of the County of Alameda, supra note 57, at 2.
91. See Non-Profit Housing Association of Northern California, supra note 87, at 1.
92. See id.
93. See California Housing Partnership, supra note 49, at 2 (together, the surveys cost
$160,000).
94. See, e.g., CBPP, supra note 53, at 15–16.
95. See Housing Partnership Network, supra note 82, at 4.
96. See CBPP, supra note 53, at 15.
97. Id. at 6. In addition, The Inclusive Communities Project questioned exclusions based
on tiny margins, noting that Dallas is included in SAFMRs with a concentration ratio of
1.544955957, while Los Angeles is excluded with a ratio of 1.54. See The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. (ICP), Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Establishing a More Effective Fair
Market Rent System 11–12 (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=
HUD-2016-0063-0062.
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include “[a] number of large, highly segregated metro areas” which
could benefit from SAFMRs.98 Other commenters wrote that HUD
should consider, in addition to the proposed rule’s three criteria, a
number of other factors which would ensure that SAFMRs are implemented in the metro areas with the highest need and where they
will have the greatest impact.99
Almost all commenters urged HUD to consider a minimum vacancy rate of five percent for implementation of SAFMRs.100 A
comment by three New York City nonprofits explained that this is
necessary because of the SAFMRs’ aforementioned push-pull approach.101 This system works well in a loose rental market like
Dallas,102 but both the push and pull mechanisms break down in
tight markets like New York City.103 With such high demand for any
available unit, landlords have a choice of tenants, and will almost
always take a non-HCV tenant over an HCV one. There are a few
reasons why they prefer to do so, but the most common are because
non-HCV tenants pay with one source of funds, are more likely to
have good credit and rental history, and can move in immediately
98. CBPP, supra note 53, at 7.
99. See Housing Authority of the City of San Buenaventura, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System 7–8 (Aug. 6, 2016), https:/
/www.regulations.gov/document?D=HUD-2016-0063-0022 (suggesting wages and employment factors, availability of rental housing, proximity to medical facilities and disability and
social services); Housing Authority of the County of Santa Clara, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System 3 (Aug. 15, 2016), https://
www.regulations.gov/document?D=HUD-2016-0063-0102 (percentage of owner-occupied
units); Massachusetts Department of Housing and Community Development, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System 3 (Aug. 15,
2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=HUD-2016-0063-0095 (access to public
transportation and employment centers); San Diego Housing Commission, Comment Letter
on Proposed Rule Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System 2 (July 26, 2016),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=HUD-2016-0063-0012 (transportation access, employment and crime rates, environmental health, and school quality); Tacoma Housing
Authority, supra note 58, at 1–2 (dispersion of voucher holders and average rents in highestcost neighborhoods).
100. See, e.g., California Housing Partnership, supra note 49, at 2. This five percent number is nearly unanimous among the comments which discussed vacancy rates, as a five
percent vacancy rate is “generally considered to be the threshold for a tight rental market.”
Enterprise Comm. Partners, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System 3 (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=
HUD-2016-0063-0081.
101. See Community Service Society et al., supra note 14, at 3.
102. See Collinson & Ganong, supra note 38, at 4. Dallas has a vacancy rate of 8.7%, above
the national rate of 7%. National Fair Housing Alliance, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule
Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System 5 (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=HUD-2016-0063-0090.
103. New York City’s vacancy rate is just 3.45%, and it is just 1.8% for units with rent less
than $800. Community Service Society et al., supra note 14, at 1.
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without mandatory inspections, repairs, and paperwork.104 Thus, in
tight markets, SAFMRs are unlikely to be effective in moving
voucher holders to high-rent areas, where rents and demand are
highest and availability lowest.105
SAFMRs also pose a threat for voucher holders who choose to
stay in their current units. As noted above, even with the final rule’s
inclusion of hold harmless provisions, these tenants face a risk of
losing their housing due to decreased payment standards—a risk
which is particularly strong in tight markets.106 In tight markets,
high demand and low vacancy rates—even in low-income areas—
mean that displaced voucher holders would face competition from
non-HCV tenants for the few available apartments.107 If SAFMRs significantly decrease payment standards, landlords in cities with rent
control ordinances may have an incentive to purposely fail HUD’s
annual inspection, forcing their HCV tenant to move out, allowing
the landlord to take the automatic rent increase that comes with
vacancy, and then renting to a less-burdensome non-HCV tenant.108
While HUD made substantial changes to its selection criteria,109
it did not address any of the commenters’ methodological issues.110
Thus, it is likely that the methodology issues raised by the commenters will continue with the switch to SAFMRs. In the final rule,
however, HUD did acknowledge commenters’ complaints of its selection criteria. First, it agreed that the voucher concentration
criterion should be adjusted to “better target communities where
voucher concentration is most severe.”111 To achieve this, it added
an additional criterion for becoming a SAMFR area: the metro area
must have a certain minimum proportion of voucher tenants living
in CLIAs, in order to only capture those areas with a high concentration of voucher tenants.112 Second, it added a criterion for
vacancy rates, explaining that very low rates indicate “rental markets
in disequilibrium.”113 It chose four percent as the minimum, to be
calculated using ACS data, which HUD explained is the equivalent
to an actual rate of five percent.114 In addition, HUD stated that it
104. See Housing Authority of the County of Alameda, supra note 57, at 2.
105. See The Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, supra note 66, at 4–5.
106. See Rent Stabilization Association of NYC, Inc., supra note 54, at 2–3.
107. See id. at 3.
108. See Community Service Society et al., supra note 14, at 11–12.
109. See Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System, 81 Fed. Reg. 80,567,
80,576–78 (Nov. 16, 2016) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 888, 982, 983, 985).
110. Id. at 80,579.
111. Id. at 80,576.
112. Id. at 80,569.
113. Id. at 80,576.
114. Id.
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will evaluate a number of additional variables for future
consideration.115
These added criteria dramatically changed the list of metro areas
which must switch to SAFMRs, removing many of the areas where
the commenters were most pessimistic about the effects of implementation, including Oakland and New York City. Although HUD
did not incorporate every proposed change to its selection criteria,
the inclusion of the aforementioned two additional criteria indicates that HUD is concerned about the consequences of the
SAFMR program and wants to ensure that the areas using SAFMRs
are those which will be most helped by the program.

D. The Rule Does Not Attack Housing Segregation
Several commenters argued vociferously that the proposed rule
should directly combat housing segregation. Inclusive Communities Project (ICP)—a Dallas advocacy group that brought the
lawsuit in 2011 which eventually led to the initial adoption of
SAFMRs in Dallas—suggested that HUD’s criteria for adopting
SAFMRs are “arbitrary and artificial formulas [that] will perpetuate
racial segregation.”116 ICP alleged that HUD initially included a
measure of racial segregation in the proposed rule but later removed it.117 ICP claimed that HUD, by doing so, excluded twentytwo large metro areas from SAFMRs, of which twenty meet HUD’s
standard of “High Segregation,” while seven of the included areas
in the proposed rule have only “Moderate Segregation.”118
ICP focused on the proposed rule’s selection criteria, specifically
on how they excluded some of the country’s most segregated metro
areas.119 As discussed above, using relative, not absolute, concentration ignores the fact that renter-occupied housing is over
concentrated in low-income and often highly segregated, areas.120
In its comment, CBPP pointed to Bridgeport (Conn.) as an example of a city left out by the relative concentration requirement.121
115. Id.
116. ICP, supra note 97, at 1.
117. Id. at 4.
118. Id. at 4–5.
119. CBPP argued that if HUD accepted its revised criteria, the result would be to add
large, heavily-segregated areas such as Cincinnati, Detroit, Memphis, and St. Louis, among
others. CBPP, supra note 53, at 8–9.
120. Id. at 7.
121. In Bridgeport, voucher holders are very concentrated in CLIAs, but its relative concentration does not meet HUD’s criterion because its ratio of voucher holders in low-income
areas to total renters there is insufficiently high. CBPP, supra note 53, at 6.
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The Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing and Opportunity Council (MSTL) suggested that the twenty percent criterion leaves out
segregated areas as well, writing that “the relationship between poverty, race, and the availability of rental units” from long-term
segregation makes these areas unlikely to meet the requirement.122
HUD responded to these criticisms, emphasizing that its focus is
on voucher concentration, not residential segregation.123 HUD did
add the additional criterion for targeting the most severe concentration, which, given the numerous connections between poverty
and race, presumably will have desegregation effects. It did not,
however, switch from relative to absolute concentration, or lower
the twenty percent criterion. Thus, while HUD identified “concentrated poverty and economic and racial segregation” as the
problems that the new rule hopes to address, it appears that addressing racial segregation is a higher priority for some of the
commenters than it is for HUD.124

E. Need for Greater Flexibility
Many commenters argued that the new rule locks SAFMR areas
into a national policy that ignores the specific characteristics of local markets, and urged HUD to give PHAs flexibility in
implementing SAFMRs.125 They argued that HUD should simplify
the process for requesting and granting exception payment standards. Under the new rule, PHAs can adjust payment standards to
110% above SAFMRs, but must get HUD approval for special exceptions above 110%.126 Although commenters disagreed on the
precise numbers, many argued that exception standards should be
far easier to apply for and should go much higher than 110% of
122. Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing and Opportunity Council, Comment Letter
on Proposed Rule Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System 2 (Aug. 15, 2016),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=HUD-2016-0063-0042.
123. Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System, 81 Fed. Reg. 80,567, 80,576
(Nov. 16, 2016) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 888, 982, 983, 985). But see Metropolitan St.
Louis Equal Housing and Opportunity Council, supra note 122, at 3–4 (arguing that applying
SAFMRs to heavily-segregated cities with concentrated poverty and low economic and social
mobility should be the purpose of the rule).
124. 81 Fed. Reg. at 80,567; cf. ICP, supra note 97, at 2, 12 (alleging that HUD’s failure to
include racial segregation as a factor violates its duty to affirmatively further fair housing
merely for HUD’s administrative convenience).
125. See, e.g., Oakland Housing Authority, supra note 55, at 2 (disapproving of HUD’s
“one size fits all” approach).
126. 24 C.F.R. § 982.503(b)(1)(iii)–(iv) (2017); see also California Association of Housing
Authorities, supra note 48, at 2.
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SAFMRs.127 Another suggestion was that HUD maintain the current
exception standard of 150% of metro area FMRs.128
Commenters also pointed to the potential unsuitability of using
zip codes as proxies for neighborhoods, arguing that PHAs should
have flexibility to define neighborhoods according to their local
knowledge.129 The Supportive Housing Network of New York, a collection of fair housing organizations, argues that New York City’s
260 zip codes “do not delineate any logical neighborhood and
rental geographies.”130 There is also a general concern that zip
codes may include both high- and low-rent areas, which threatens
to make SAFMRs unrepresentative for large segments of the zip
code.131 Thus, commenters argue that PHAs should have the flexibility to define small areas according to their local conditions by
bundling together zip codes or dividing them into census tracts.132
Similarly, the San Diego Housing Commission worries that the
mandatory nature of the proposed rule will prevent PHAs from devising their own local solutions.133
HUD did not address these concerns in the final rule, other than
noting that they were raised. It did not change the exception payment standard requirements in the final rule,134 but it argued that
its hold harmless provisions achieve the same results in terms of
127. See Enhanced Section 8 Outreach Program in Yonkers, NY, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System 1 (Aug. 15, 2016), https://
www.regulations.gov/document?D=HUD-2016-0063-0053; Housing Partnership Network,
supra note 82, at 3; Philadelphia Housing Authority, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System 2 (Aug. 11, 2016), https://www.
regulations.gov/document?D=HUD-2016-0063-0029.
128. This change would have made a significant impact. In Chicago’s North Side Lakeview neighborhood, the average rent for a two-bedroom apartment is $1,880. Metropolitan
Planning Council, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System 1 (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=HUD-20160063-0066. The adjusted 150% two-bedroom FMR for Chicago is $1,764, while the unadjusted hypothetical two-bedroom SAFMR is far lower, only $1,280. Id.
129. See, e.g., Housing Authority of the County of Santa Clara, supra note 99, at 2 (“The
[Authority] has a more thorough understanding of the County’s economic break down by
neighborhood and would be able to set better neighborhood/zip code specific payment standards than HUD.”).
130. Supportive Housing Network of New York, supra note 65, at 2.
131. See Greater New Orleans Housing Alliance, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System 1 (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.
regulations.gov/document?D=HUD-2016-0063-0063; Housing Authority of the County of
Santa Clara, supra note 99, at 2 (showing the dispersion of poverty in Santa Clara (Calif.)
County, with eleven of the twenty low-income census tracts spread across two cities and thirteen zip codes).
132. See Council of Large Public Housing Authorities, supra note 77, at 8 (describing
successful sub-FMR area programs across the country).
133. See e.g., San Diego Housing Commission, supra note 99, at 1.
134. Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System, 81 Fed. Reg. 80,567, 80,577
(Nov. 16, 2016) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 888, 982, 983, 985).
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protecting tenants from dramatic decreases in payment standards.135 Similarly, HUD did not adopt greater flexibility, sticking
instead with measuring SAFMRs at the zip code level. Thus, the effect of using zip codes—rather than some other determinant of
small areas—on a national scale is yet to be determined.136

F. Waiting Until Demonstrations Finish
The last major issue that commenters raised with the rule is that
it is “not evidence-based policy making.”137 The Seattle Housing Authority observed that HUD assumes a few results from the switch to
SAFMRs, but it offers no “rigorous, systematic evaluation” to support these claims.138 The proposed rule “only cite[d] a single article
[Collinson & Ganong] that looks at a single metropolitan area [Dallas].”139 HUD did not even wait to finish its five demonstrations
before implementing the proposed rule, let alone analyze the results.140 Preservation Working Group, a national coalition of
housing interests, noted the irresponsibility of moving forward with
SAFMRs when the largest pre-SAFMR mobility program was the
Gautreaux Assisted Housing Program, which moved 7,100 families
in Chicago over more than a decade, while this rule would affect
seventy-five times that many immediately.141
In addition, the commenters argued that the results of the Dallas
demonstration cannot be extrapolated nationally because the conditions in Dallas are not representative of the country as a whole.
Dallas has lots of available land, few restrictions on new housing
135. See id. at 80,573.
136. See id. at 80,579.
137. Council of Large Public Housing Authorities, supra note 77, at 2.
138. Seattle Housing Authority, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Establishing a More
Effective Fair Market Rent System 2 (Aug. 5, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=HUD-2016-0063-0064.
139. Council of Large Public Housing Authorities, supra note 77, at 2; see also Establishing
a More Effective Fair Market Rent System; Using Small Area Fair Market Rents in Housing
Choice Voucher Program Instead of the Current 50th Percentile FMRs, 81 Fed. Reg. 39,218,
39,221, 39,231 n.14 (proposed June 16, 2016), (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 888, 982, 983
& 985); Collinson & Ganong, supra note 38. It is worth noting that two commenters raise
issues with the methodology and the validity of the conclusions of the Collinson and Ganong
paper cited by HUD in the proposed rule. National Association of Home Builders, supra note
53, at 2; National Multifamily Housing Council, supra note 67, at 2.
140. See The Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, supra note 66, at 8.
141. See The Preservation Working Group, supra note 63, at 4, at 1–2. See generally Peter H.
Schuck, Judging Remedies: Judicial Approaches to Housing Segregation, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
289, 319–23 (2002).
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supply, is relatively affordable,142 and has a vacancy rate above the
national average, allowing forty-four percent of voucher households
to move in the three-year period that SAFMRs were implemented.143 As the Housing Authority for the County of Alameda
(Calif.) states, “A preliminary assessment of one mid-western suburban city seems insufficient to embark on a nationwide mandatory
rule (which HUD estimates will [affect] 28 percent of all
vouchers). . . .”144
In the final rule, HUD brushed off these concerns. It acknowledged that more information will come as the demonstrations
finish, but decided to move forward with the rule anyway.145 It argued that “it is not premature to implement [SAFMRs] on this
limited basis in those areas where it has the potential to address
significant voucher concentration concerns.”146
The August 2017 delaying notice reversed this stance, citing the
interim report received in April 2017 as one of the reasons for the
delay. The notice stated that the interim findings justify delay to
further study the costs and benefits of SAFMRs, specifically rent
burdens on voucher holders and the availability of units. However,
the District Court found material differences between the metro
areas in the interim report and the twenty-three affected metro areas, which calls into question the usefulness of the findings of the
interim report altogether.147 It remains to be seen how much weight
HUD, interested parties, and reviewing courts will place on the
findings of the demonstrations for extrapolating the rule’s national
impact.

142. See Housing Authority of the County of Alameda, supra note 57, at 3; BRIAN
STROMBERG & MINDY AULT, PAYCHECK TO PAYCHECK 2016 app. A (2016), https://www.nhc.
org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/nhc-p2p-2016.pdf (finding Dallas to be only the seventieth least affordable metropolitan area for working renters); see also National Housing
Conference, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Establishing a More Effective Fair Market
Rent System 5, n.7 (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=HUD-20160063-0043 (citing the Stromberg & Ault survey).
143. See California Housing Partnership, supra note 49, at 5.
144. Housing Authority of the County of Alameda, supra note 57, at 3.
145. See Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System, 81 Fed. Reg. 80,567,
80,579 (Nov. 16, 2016) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 888, 982, 983, 985).
146. Id.
147. See Open Communities Alliance, supra note 7, at 29-36.
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SAFMRs Have the Potential to Provide Great Benefits
Despite the unaddressed issues raised by commenters and HUD’s
subsequent decision to delay implementation, the rule should not
be abandoned altogether. As currently calculated, FMRs have not
proven effective at deconcentrating poverty, as the majority of
voucher holders still live in low-income neighborhoods.148 SAFMRs
are an appealing solution to the problems caused by using metro
area FMRs. The National Housing Conference (NHC) points to two
suburbs of Boston—Lynn, with a $47,195 median income, and
Newton, with a $118,639 median income—as emblematic of why
metro area FMRs do not work.149 The differences in income levels
indicate that rental housing will be more expensive in Newton than
in Lynn. An average between the two price levels is likely to be
above the median price in Lynn but below the median price in
Newton, covering many units in Lynn but very few in Newton.150
Thus, metro area FMRs push voucher holders towards the lowerincome communities whose rental values are below the metro area
average. SAFMRs, on the other hand, allow HUD to calculate FMRs
at an amount more appropriate for Newton, opening up far more
of the available units there.
Along with simply being a change from an ineffective status quo,
the new rule’s purpose is an admirable one. HUD proposed the
switch to SAFMRs specifically to break up concentrations of poverty,
and eliminate racial and economic segregation prevalent in many
of the nation’s metro areas.151 Properly calculated, SAFMRs offer
low-income people the opportunity to move into lower-poverty
neighborhoods that can offer greater opportunities. Research
found that this can have a significant long-term impact for young
children—increasing a child’s lifetime earnings by over $300,000,
and making him or her more likely to attend college.152 Benefits
such as these extend into the next generation as well.153
Although the results are preliminary, SAFMRs appear to work
both in practice and in theory. Researchers at U.C. Davis studying
the hypothetical impact of SAFMRs in three California regions (San
148.
149.
150.
151.
80,567
152.
153.

Id. at 80, 567–68.
National Housing Conference, supra note 142, at 2.
Id.
See Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System, 81 Fed. Reg. 80,567,
(Nov. 16, 2016) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 888, 982, 983, 985).
Chetty et al., supra note 30, at 5, 22.
Id. at 25–26.
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Diego, Sacramento, and the Bay Area—San Francisco, Oakland,
and San Jose) concluded that switching to SAFMRs would increase
a voucher holder’s access to rental units in low-poverty and job-rich
neighborhoods.154 Although they projected some potential adverse
effects,155 overall, they found that SAFMRs would accomplish
HUD’s goal of deconcentrating poverty.156 Similarly, Robert Collinson and Peter Ganong, studying the Dallas SAFMR demonstration,
found that voucher owners tended to move to much higher quality
neighborhoods, especially when compared with results in neighboring Fort Worth, which used metro area FMRs.157 Further, they
found SAFMRs to be a more effective means of improving neighborhood quality than simply raising FMRs or shifting from fortieth
percentile FMRs to fiftieth percentile.158

B. Specific Recommendations for Adopting and
Tweaking the Final Rule
Given the potential positive impact of SAFMRs and the encouraging early results from the demonstrations, this Note recommends
that HUD immediately implement the rule, while continuing to
tweak it as necessary now that it is implemented nationally. HUD
should not continue to attempt to delay implementation, and it certainly should not revoke it entirely. The final rule dramatically
improved upon the proposed rule, fixing many of the biggest flaws
identified by the commenters. However, not all of the issues raised
by the commenters have been sufficiently alleviated, and switching
to SAFMRs will likely have some adverse effects, which HUD should
address as they arise.
154. See MATTHEW PALM & DEBBIE NIEMEIER, UNIV. OF CAL., DAVIS, THE IMPACT OF SCALE
CHANGES OF FAIR MARKET RENTS ON TRANSIT AND JOBS ACCESS OF SECTION 8 ELIGIBLE UNITS IN
THREE OF CALIFORNIA’S LARGEST MPOS 17 fig.2 (2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=HUD-2016-0063-0075. Of the regions studied by the researchers, only Sacramento
(where they found the most positive results) and San Diego are included in the metro areas
covered by the final rule. Memorandum from Dep’t Hous. & Urban Development, Suspension of Small Area Fair Market Rent (FMR) Designations (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.
huduser.gov/portal/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/SecretarysDetermination.pdf; see also Notice for Suspension of Small Area Fair Market Rent (Small Area FMR) Designations;
Solicitation of Comment, 82 Fed. Reg. 58,349 (Dec. 12, 2017).
155. Of particular concern: accessibility in Oakland would decline by fifty percent and
would make large parts of San Jose inaccessible. PALM & NIEMEIER, supra note 154, at 38.
Researchers suggested that HUD could mitigate these effects by establishing floors below
which SAFMRs could not fall, which HUD incorporated into the final rule. Id. at 47.
156. Id. at 47–48.
157. Collinson & Ganong, supra note 38, at 15–16.
158. Id. at 18.
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First, although HUD rejected a more explicit focus on segregation, it should nevertheless tweak its selection criteria to
incorporate the changes recommended by CBPP to include the
large, highly-segregated metro areas where SAFMRs may have the
greatest impact. CBPP would drop the percentage of rental units in
high-SAFMR zip codes from twenty percent to fifteen and would
switch from relative to absolute voucher concentration.159 In both
the proposed and final rules, HUD emphasized fighting concentration in low-income areas as the foremost goal of SAFMRs,160 yet it
never offered a justification as to this preference, nor did it address
why housing segregation is not provided a higher priority.161 Given
that the current HUD policy remains to affirmatively further fair
housing, HUD should do more to ensure that its SAFMR rule actively fights segregation, rather than exist merely as a byproduct of
reducing voucher concentration.162
Second, HUD should allow PHAs to implement SAFMRs flexibly
because a national rule may not perfectly match local conditions.
HUD should make it easier for PHAs to apply for exception payment standards, which should go above 110% of metro area
FMR.163 Third, PHAs should be able to define neighborhoods according to their local knowledge and either bundle zip codes
159. CBPP, supra note 53, at 7.
160. Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System, 81 Fed. Reg. 80,567,
80,567–68 (Nov. 16, 2016) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 888, 982, 983, 985).
161. See Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System: Using Small Area Fair
Market Rents in Housing Choice Voucher Program Instead of the Current 50th Percentile
FMRs, 81 Fed. Reg. 39,218 (proposed June 16, 2016) (to be codified at 24 CFR pts. 888, 982,
983, 985) (“The purpose of this proposed rule is to establish a more effective means for HCV
tenants to move into areas of higher opportunity and lower poverty . . . and . . . help reduce
the number of voucher families that reside in areas of high poverty concentration.”); 81 Fed.
Reg. at 80,568 (“Based on early evidence from PHAs using Small Area FMRs that are in place
in certain metropolitan areas in the U.S., HUD believes that Small Area FMRs are more
effective in helping families move to areas of higher opportunity and lower poverty.”).
It is worth noting that the political situation since this rule was proposed and finalized has
changed. It is unclear what the Trump administration’s policy on the HCV program is, what
HUD’s budget will be, or what the status of this rule is going forward. See Open Communities
Alliance, supra note 7; see Notice for Suspension of Small Area Fair Market Rent (Small Area
FMR) Designations; Solicitation of Comment, 82 Fed. Reg. 58,349 (Dec. 12, 2017) (inviting
comments on whether HUD ought to change the suspension).
162. See generally Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,271 (July 16,
2015) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576 & 903).
163. See Enhanced Section 8 Outreach Program in Yonkers, NY, supra note 127, at 1 (“For
exception payment standard requests between 110% to 120% of the SAFMRs, the only program justification required should be inability to secure housing . . . .”); Housing Partnership
Network, supra note 82, at 3 (advocating that exception payment standards should go “up to
120% of FMR without HUD approval to streamline program administration”); Philadelphia
Housing Authority, supra note 127, at 2 (“PHA believes that exception payment standards up
to 150% of the SAFMR should be available through this streamlined process.”).
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together or divide them if necessary.164 Fourth, given the effect that
SAFMRs will have in gentrifying neighborhoods,165 HUD should
grant PHAs the authority to define these neighborhoods and specifically protect them from payment standard decreases. Fifth, HUD
ought to provide additional funding for PHAs for landlord outreach to keep landlords in the program, as well as mobility
counseling, which has proven effective in Dallas in helping voucher
holders move.166
Lastly, HUD should revise its methodology for calculating
SAFMRs to increase their accuracy. HUD should follow Housing
Partnership Network’s suggestion to use the percentage change in
the metro area rents published in HUD’s Office of Policy Development and Research quarterly regional reports instead of national
inflation factors.167 HUD should also calculate SAFMRs independently for each bedroom size. CBPP advises that HUD do this by
determining the ratio of rent for each unit in the zip code to the
median rent for that unit size in the metro area, finding the median
of these ratios for all units of all sizes in the zip code, and multiplying this median ratio for each unit size to determine the SAFMR for
that unit size.168
Despite the numerous concerns raised by the commenters, many
of them remain optimistic about the effect SAFMRs will have.169
The strongest case for implementing the proposed rule is from the
Housing Authority of Cook County, which has been actively using
SAFMRs since 2013 as part of HUD’s demonstration, stating:
we would not go back to the days when our payment standards
were set at the 50th percentile FMRs (let alone the 40th percentile). The SAFMRs have expanded housing choice for our

164. See Council of Large Public Housing Authorities, supra note 77, at 8.
165. See Community Service Society et al., supra note 14, at 6, 11–12 (“Because the hypothetical SAFMRs incentivize tenants to move from these neighborhoods, the rule would have
the unintended consequence of hastening gentrification and displacement from neighborhoods which are beginning to see the changes brought by new residents and new
investment.”).
166. See Prairie State Legal Services, supra note 50, at 3.
167. Housing Partnership Network, supra note 82, at 4.
168. CBPP, supra note 53, at 15.
169. See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Housing Alliance, supra note 131, at 1 (“[Greater New
Orleans Housing Alliance] is excited about the proposed [SAFMR] rule.”). But see National
Association of Home Builders, supra note 53, at 2 (“[W]e believe that the case is very weak for
using [SAFMRs] set at the zip code level . . . .”).
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participants, which would otherwise have been nearly impossible. While it was administratively burdensome to implement
the SAFMRs, it was worth every effort it took.170
CONCLUSION
HUD is right to promulgate a rule that works in theory and in
practice, is supported by those whom it will affect, and has a noble
purpose. It was also right to change the proposed rule to reflect the
serious concerns of many groups who will interact with this rule:
PHAs, elected officials, and concerned nonprofits, among others.
Due to serious concerns about the likely adverse effects that the
rule, as promulgated, will have, HUD should pay close attention to
these consequences and alter the rule accordingly to best serve
HCV holders. Low-income Americans deserve an effective SAFMR
rule that will help, not harm them.

170. Housing Authority of Cook County, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Establishing
a More Effective Fair Market Rent System 1 (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=HUD-2016-0063-0111.

